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Abstract 
It is commonly believed that accumulation of human capital (HC) and availability of 
physical and financial capitals are among the major determinants of economic growth. In 
a globalised world, where factors of production are increasingly mobile, the process of 
domestic accumulation of HC might be affected in several ways through migration and 
capital inflows. Furthermore, endowment of skilled labour and foreign direct investments 
(FDI) may reinforce each other through possible “complementary effects”. Our paper 
aims to advance the existing empirical literature on the relationship between international 
factor mobility and domestic accumulation of HC in developing countries. We provide 
new evidence on how the presence of foreign firms in the domestic economy and the 
emigration of skilled workers impact the domestic school enrolment . We also investigate 
whether existing supply of skilled labour is a significant determinant of inward flows of 
foreign  capital.  The  interdependence  between  factor  mobility  and  HC  accumulation 
supports some simple back-of-the-envelop calculations aiming to investigate the presence 
of a virtuous (vicious) circle between HC accumulation and FDI inflows. 
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1. Introduction 
It is commonly believed that accumulation of human capital (HC) and availability of physical 
and financial capitals are among the major determinants of economic growth; it is also widely 
accepted that the lack of these resources (along with the inability to expand them) are potential 
reasons behind the delay of many poor countries in achieving development. 
In  a  globalised  world,  where  factors  of  production  are  increasingly  mobile,  the  process  of 
domestic accumulation of HC might be affected in several ways. In fact, while in principle the 
availability of foreign capital in the form of inward foreign direct investments (FDI) and an elastic 
supply of skilled (educated) workers may individually enhance growth prospects, they can also 
reinforce each other through possible “complementary effects”. The presence of foreign investors in 
the home economy can provide incentives to invest in education for both people and governments:  
people may want to attain higher level of education in order to access better job opportunities 
offered by foreign firms, and governments may want to support the accumulation of HC in order to 
benefit from possible spillovers of FDI (technology and knowledge transfer). In addition, a good 
HC endowment makes the investment climate more attractive for foreign investors, offering an 
educated workforce which is also likely to be associated to socio-political stability. 
Ideally, a virtuous circle of HC and FDI can be attained whenever «host countries experience 
continuous inflow of FDI over time by increasingly attracting higher value-added MNEs, while at 
the  same  time  upgrading  the  skill  contents  of  pre-existing  MNEs  and  domestic  enterprises» 
[Miyamoto (2003), p.9]. Symmetrically, a Pareto inferior equilibrium is also possible: inadequate 
supply of skills discourages FDI and the lack of FDI depresses the demand for skills. 
But factor mobility does not concern financial and physical capitals only. Domestic workforce is 
also mobile, and when  international migration is considered, the domestic accumulation of HC 
needs further qualification. Even if migration flows have grown less than trade and FDI flows over 
the last decades [see Sapir (2000), Faini (2006)], the ongoing “brain drain”, enhanced by selective 
immigration policies
1 in developed economies, is one of the suspect among the forces negatively 
affecting the economic performance of developing countries. According to an established view, 
skilled  migration  causes  the  flee  of  the  most  talented  and  entrepreneurial  individuals  from  the 
countries  of  origin,  and  severely  hampers  its  growth  prospects.  Thus  the  outflow  of  educated 
workers is expected to negatively impact onto the domestic stock of cumulated HC. 
                                                 
1 In response to the growing shortage of skilled workers, most receiving countries have tried to shift the focus of their 
immigration policy, favouring the recruitment of highly skilled workers. This new twist in the policy stance toward 
immigration has become a source of considerable concern in traditionally sending countries, which fear the loss of their 
most skilled and entrepreneurial workers.   3 
In sharp contrast with this expectation, a recent but rapidly developing literature emphasizes a 
possible positive effect of skilled migration on the origin country. The brain drain becomes, in this 
view, a “brain gain”. Among others, three different channels can be distinguished for a beneficial 
brain drain to operate: a) skilled migrants raise economic welfare at home thanks to a relatively 
large  flow  of  remittances
2;  b)  selective  immigration  policies  in  host  countries  may  raise  the 
attractiveness  of  migration  for  high  skilled  individuals,  which  in  turn  raises  private  returns  to 
education  (due  to  reduced  supply)  and  induces  additional  investment  in  education  at  home;  c) 
skilled  migration  may  favour  growth-enhancing  technology  transfer,  trade  and  foreign  direct 
investments between the source and the host country (network effects). 
Points b) and c) provides further qualifications about possible complementarities between HC 
and FDI in the wake of international migration. Mountford (1997) was the first to suggest the 
possibility that migration prospects create incentives to invest more in education: since not all of 
those who invest in education can (or will choose to) migrate, the post-migration level of human 
capital can increase. Similar results were found by Stark et al. (1998). Stark et al. (1997) add to this 
literature by showing that the possibility of a brain gain might stem from the imperfect information 
of destination country’s employers on the skills of the migrants and the impact of return migration. 
The  wage  adjustment  taking  place  once  the  true  ability  of  immigrants  is  revealed  to  foreign 
employers may induce a subset of individuals to return home. Under certain conditions the post-
return average level of human capital is higher than that of a closed economy. The literature on this 
issue is rapidly growing, but the empirical evidence is mixed. In a cross-country regression with 50 
developing countries, Beine et al. (2001), using data from Carrington and Detragiache (1998), find a 
positive effect of skilled migration on human capital investment in the source country and a positive 
relation between growth and the proportion of highly educated individuals at home. Applying a 
different empirical  approach to the same dataset, Faini (2002) found that the rate of migration 
among educated individuals was weakly and negatively correlated with tertiary enrolment at home. 
Using a new dataset on migration stocks and rates by country of origin and educational attainment, 
developed  by  Docquier  and  Marfouk  (2005),  Mariani  (2004)  estimates  a  cross-country  growth 
regression on a large number of developing countries and finds that the relation between brain drain 
and growth is non linear and high skilled migration affects positively the growth rate only if a large 
proportion of individuals at home is enrolled in (or have completed) at most the secondary school; 
according to the author, this result indicates that larger countries are more likely to enjoy positive 
                                                 
2 The underlining argument proceeds as follows: skilled migrants typically earn relatively more and, ceteris paribus, 
will therefore save more and remit to relatives remaining inland. However, skilled migrants are also likely to spend a 
longer span of time abroad and also are more likely to reunite with their close family in the host country. Both factors 
should be associated with a relatively smaller rather than larger flow of remittances from skilled migrants. Faini (2006) 
provides evidence supporting this counter-argument.   4 
feedbacks from high skilled migrations. Thus, if the focus is on the accumulation of human capital, 
the role of skilled migration cannot be neglected and it still represents an unsettled empirical issue. 
For what concerns implications of point c), namely technology transfer through networking, it is 
worth noticing that since developing countries typically lack resources to develop new technologies 
on  their  own,  what  matters  for  growth  is  their  ability  to  appropriate  and  adopt  advanced 
technologies developed elsewhere. The literature on technology diffusion/transfer has focused on 
trade and foreign direct investments as the two main channels in this respect, provided that the host 
country is endowed with a sufficient level of competences to make this absorption viable. Migrants 
may personally be involved in trading and investing in their home country, thus boosting trade and 
foreign capital inflows, thanks to their inside knowledge or their social ties. Network effects with 
people still living in their country of origin can also be exploited by their foreign employers to enter 
their home market (Lucas, 2004). 
Our  paper  aims  to  address  empirically  some  of  these  open  questions  guided  by  theoretical 
considerations at the basis of a simple conceptual framework (see Appendix B). In Section 2 we 
provide  further  evidence  on  the  relationships  between  international  factor  mobility  (FDI  and 
migration) and domestic accumulation of HC in developing countries. In Section 3 we explore 
potential  complementarities  between  FDI  and  HC  by  investigating  whether  existing  supply  of 
skilled labour is a significant determinant of inward flows of foreign capital. The interdependence 
between factor mobility and HC accumulation supports some back-of-the-envelop calculations on 
the impact of migration on domestic HC accumulation in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Do migration and inward FDI impact enrolments? 
We start by focussing on the consequences of factor mobility onto educational choices in 
developing countries. A simple equation (which corresponds to equation (5) in Appendix B) relates 
enrolment rate 
j
it e  in educational level  j  ( j  = secondary, tertiary) in country  i and year  t to the 
presence of foreign firms (proxied by the cumulated stock of FDI) in the domestic economy and to 
migration trends of educated workers (MIG)  
 




it C MIG FDI e e + t + × d + × b + × b + m = 2 1 log   (1) 
 
where  it C  is a set of country specific factors affecting educational choices (control variables), 
j
i m  is 
a country fixed effect,   t t  is a time fixed effect and  it e  is an error term.   5 
On  the  basis  of  our  theoretical  considerations  (see  Appendix  B),  one  would  expect  the 
presence of foreign firms providing incentives to enrol in higher education programs ( 0 1 > b ) . As 
far as the migration of  skilled workers is concerned, a negative impact on domestic enrolment 
( 0 2 < b ) can be taken as evidence of “brain drain”, whereas a positive effect ( 0 2 > b ) can be taken 
as evidence of “brain gain”. Relevant control variables for this specification are related to the stage 
of development of the economy (presence of liquidity constraint / endemic poverty), to the quality 
of the educational system and to other supply side factors
3.  
 
2.1 Dataset and variables definition 
Our dependent variables are extracted by data on educational enrolment on quinquennial base 
collected by  Barro and  Lee  (2000) integrated by  data on emigration rates by educational level 
collected in Doquier and Marfouk (2005). The intersection of these two datasets containing non 
missing information in at least one of the two points in time (1990 and 2000) is non empty for 147 
developing countries. When we consider a balanced panel version of this sample of countries, their 
number reduces significantly. 
We  expand  this  dataset  with  information  on  existing  stock  of  foreign  direct  investment 
(referred to the two relevant years or in their proximity), quality of the education, and additional 
control  variables  (like  GDP  per  capita,  mortality  rates,  credit  availability  to  the  private  sector, 
population  density).  More  specifically,  we  have  considered  alternative  measures  of  education 
quality
4, including public spending on education as % of GDP, the pupil-teacher ratio at primary 
school (the corresponding measure for secondary school is available only for later years) and the 
repetition rate at primary school, but the only variable showing weak statistical significance in some 
regression is the one surviving in the text (pupil/teacher ratio). Among the control variables
5 we 
have considered alternative measures for the stage of development: in addition to GDP per capita 
and population density, we have considered urban/rural population (to account for the supply side 
of educational resources), fuel exports (to account for technology development) as well as measures 
of local inequality (Gini inequality index). Unfortunately, endemic missing data prevent us to use 
income  inequality  measures  (like  the  Gini  inequality  index  or  income  shares  by  quintiles)  as 
                                                 
3 Theory would suggest to include also a variable accounting for remittances among regressors. This would capture a 
possible poverty relief feedback effect of migration. But an improvement in financial conditions of a family could 
enhance both investment in education and further migration (i.e. migration cost becoming affordable, family reunion, 
etc.).  Hence,  the  impact  of  such  a  variable  is  not  conceptually  univocal.  Unfortunately,  coverage  of  series  on 
international remittances is not complete for many countries in our sample. Furthermore, since not all financial flows 
due to migration follow official channels, data on remittances are not fully reliable and they might be an inappropriate 
proxy for what is called “diaspora exernality”. For these reasons we decided to exclude remittances from our regression. 
4 Indicators concerning the quality of the educational system in single countries are extracted from the EdStat on-line 
service provided by the World Bank. 
5 Control variables are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.    6 
indicators of life conditions in the country of origin and possible poverty constraints.
6 In order to 
overcome this limitation, we complemented the GDP per capita with both credit to the private 
sector (from Beck et al. 2000) and infant mortality rate series. The choice for the latter variable is 
suggested by two orders of considerations: in the first place, mortality is usually highly correlated 
with endemic poverty, in the second place, it might be also correlated with educational decisions 
since  “a  reduction  in  mortality  increases  the  number  of  periods  over  which  the  returns  from 
investments in knowledge can be collected” [Grossman (2005), p.18]. The private credit by (deposit 
money)  banks  over  GDP  accounts  for  financial  market  imperfections  that  render  liquidity 
constraints more stringent for poor families. We have also considered other geographical variables 





We have selected gross enrolment rates by educational level (secondary and tertiary – primary 
enrolment is compulsory everywhere, and attendance rates tend to reach 100%) over almost two 
decades (1985-2000). Taking into account missing information on regressors, in its largest version 
we have 195 observations covering 112 countries for secondary enrolment, and 181 observations 
for 108 countries in case of tertiary enrolment; when we restrict ourselves to the balanced panel 
version we can rely on 57 countries only. Results are quite stable across different samples, so we 
report here those obtained relying on the larger unbalanced panel set of observations and countries. 
Descriptive  statistics  are  reported  in  table  A1  in  the  Appendix  A;  similarly,  tables  referring  to 
results obtained in the balanced panel are reported in Tables A2 and A3 in the same Appendix A.  
In  Table  1  we  report  our  estimates  for  secondary  enrolment,  while  Table  2  contains  the 
corresponding estimates for tertiary enrolment. The first column of both tables reports simple OLS 
correlations, while columns 2 to 4 use a fixed effects estimator; column 5 deals with the problem of 
potential endogeneity with a IV fixed effects estimator, and finally column 6 adopts a Hausman-
Taylor estimator. 
We start with secondary enrolment in Table 1. The strongest correlation we obtain is with the 
GDP per capita and with previous enrolment in primary education, to be interpreted as evidence of 
schooling  being  a  vertically  integrated  process.  This  suggests  that  (secondary)  educational 
                                                 
6 We experimented with data from World Bank (Deininger and Squire) dataset as well as with Wider dataset, but in 
both cases the sample size was almost halved and the variable was always non significant. Checchi (2003) finds a 
significant negative correlation between Gini index and secondary educational attainment, in a larger dataset of low-
middle income countries. 
7 They include: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and 
North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.   7 
attainment  is  associated  with  the  stage  of  development  of  a  country,  possibly  reflecting  the 
availability  of  resources  to  families  which  are  necessary  to  undertake  educational  investments. 
Points estimates for the credit to private sector and the infant mortality  rate bear the expected 
correct sign (positive for the former and negative for the latter), but standard errors are large enough 
to make them non significant. 
The migration rate of people with tertiary educational attainment exhibits negative correlation 
with secondary school enrolment under all specifications but simple OLS, but the impact is not 
statistically significant.
8 In order to account for the potential endogeneity of migration rates, we 
have also considered an instrumental variable estimator, where instruments are the (log of) stocks of 
national migrants in major destination areas (US and EU) ten years before
9. Under the estimation 
with IV, the coefficients on migration rate at tertiary level increases in size but does not show any 
increased statistical significance. 
When we look at the presence of foreign investors in the domestic economy (measured by the 
log of inward FDI stock) we observe a negative correlation with secondary enrolment. This might 
look rather counter-intuitive. But it is necessary to bear in mind that our measure of stocks of 
inward FDI’s does not allow a distinction among types of investments and/or sectors. FDI motives 
(whether market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, resources-seeking or a combination among them) may 
differ  across countries  and thus be more differentiated at the sectoral-country level
10. Different 
types of FDI can provide different incentives to invest in education since they require different 
types  of  skills  according  to  their  main  activity  (extraction  of  mineral  resources,  production  of 
manufactures, provision of services). Thus the negative sign associated with the log of inward FDI 
stock might hinder a compositional effect. When we interact this variable with regional dummies 
(in column 4), we notice that this effect is mainly driven by the poorest countries in the region 
(Africa and South Asia, corresponding to 33 out of 57 countries in the balanced sample). Despite 
                                                 
8 Ideally, when considering the impact of migration trends onto enrolment at secondary school one would include 
among regressors not only the migration rate at the corresponding educational level, but also at the tertiary level. In fact, 
emigration  of  graduates  workers  could  affect  the  decision  to  invest  in  HC  also  at  the  previous  level.  The  high 
correlation between the migration rates at secondary and tertiary level (0.74) poses serious collinearity problems on 
such a specification. So we restrict ourselves to one rate only. For the sake of comparability we present here results 
obtained by employing the “rate of migration at tertiary level” as independent variable for both (secondary and tertiary) 
enrolment rates. 
9 See Javorcik et al. (2006). One may reasonably argue that the stock of previous migration may attract additional 
migrants,  without  necessarily  affect  educational  choices  at  home.  We  have  tested  for  possible  overidentifying 
restrictions  in  every  regression  with  IV  techniques  (both  under  FE  and  HT  methodologies).  Results  point  to  the 
direction of a correct choice of instruments. 
10 Miyamoto (2003) shows that FDI sectoral differentiation at regional level changes over time. African region appears 
to go against the overall developing country trends with the share of primary goods remaining high and constant and the 
share of services diminishing. This is due to the fact that a large number of MNEs operating in Africa are still attracted 
by the abundance of natural resources rather than by the market or by the host-country investment climate. The Latin 
American and the Caribbean regions show a large drop in the share of the manufacturing sector with a corresponding 
increase in the share of the services sector. The Asian region exhibits a large and stable share of the manufacturing 
sector.   8 
unavailability of more detailed information about the type of FDI in each country, this regional 
effect could be interpreted as evidence of investment more projected to the exploitation of natural 
resources  (which  do  not  require  highly  educated  local  labour  force)  than  to  the  acquisition  of 
existing activities and/or to the start-up of new companies.
11 
 
Table 1 – Gross enrolment rate – Secondary Education (1990-2000) – Unbalanced Panel 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  OLS  FE  FE  FE  FE IV  HT 
log gdp per capita  0.094  0.171  0.171  0.205  0.166  0.17 
  [5.66]***  [2.73]***  [1.88]*  [2.22]**  [1.89]*  [2.56]** 
infant mortality rate 1000 live birth  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  [5.52]***  [0.74]  [0.87]  [0.86]  [0.86]  [0.77] 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks / GDP  0.03  0.123  0.12  0.126  0.119  0.124 
  [0.43]  [1.06]  [0.91]  [0.86]  [1.18]  [1.50] 
log stock of inward FDI  -0.006  -0.009  -0.028    -0.027  -0.024 
  [0.74]  [1.12]  [3.29]***    [2.26]**  [2.52]** 
Migration rate tertiary educ  0.006  -0.131  -0.248  -0.219  -0.569  -0.257 
  [0.09]  [0.73]  [1.27]  [1.13]  [1.04]  [1.30] 
enrolment rate primary 5 years before  0.133  0.187  0.193  0.185  0.183  0.19 
  [2.64]***  [1.71]*  [1.67]  [1.62]  [1.55]  [1.96]** 
log pupil/teacher primary      -0.034  -0.018  -0.03  -0.039 
      [0.42]  [0.18]  [0.35]  [0.55] 
log Population density (people per sq. km)      -0.519  -0.358  -0.526  -0.413 
      [2.40]**  [1.55]  [2.88]***  [3.11]*** 
          2.626  migcountry (countries with mig.ter.>0.1  
or mig.sec.>0.05)            [2.35]** 
log inflow FDI´East Asia and Pacific        -0.024     
        [1.35]     
log inflow FDI´European and Central Asia        -0.017     
        [1.62]     
log inflow FDI´Latin America and Caribbean        -0.02     
        [0.56]     
log inflow FDI´Middle East and North Africa        -0.07     
        [3.99]***     
log inflow FDI´South Asia        -0.098     
        [4.96]***     
log inflow FDI´Sub-Saharan Africa        -0.041     
        [2.24]**     
Observations  195  195  174  174  172  172 
R²  0.72  0.55  0.6  0.65     
Number of countries  112  112  109  109  108  108 
   Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   Year dummy included - regional controls included in HT 
   IV for FE: log of stock of own migrants in US and in EU (10 years before) 
 
The additional control provided by the pupil/teacher ratio at primary level (as a proxy the 
quality of education received) is statistically insignificant. The log of population density might be 
interpreted as a complement to the pupil/teacher ratio in capturing availability of school resources. 
In principle one would expect that a highly concentrated population decreases the cost of providing 
                                                 
11 This interpretation is however at odds with the higher impact observed for the interaction of FDI with the South Asia 
dummy (which include India and Nepal), where natural resources are not in general abundant.   9 
schooling services. Thus, a negative sign, as the one found in our estimates, advocates for saturation 
effect  and/or  lack  of  school  resources,  which  points  in  the  direction  of  possible  supply-side 
constraints. 
Leaving aside for a while the final column of Table 1 (to be commented below), we now 
consider tertiary enrolment, as reported in Table 2. Most of stage-of-development controls seem not 
work  in  this  case:  GDP  per  capita,  credit  to  the  private  sector  and  mortality  rates  are  all  non 
significant (except in the OLS version). This is not surprising, since people attending university in 
developing countries are typically self-selected from the upper tail of the income distribution, and 
they are relatively unaffected by what happen in the lower tail of the income distribution.
12 The 
same line of argument would induce us to expect a positive contribution of enrolment rates at the 
previous stage, but this variable has a significant correlation at the 20% confidence interval. 
When considering migration, we find that migration rate at tertiary level has a negative 
statistical significance under fixed effect (column 2), but this effect is lost once we introduce further 
controls. In this case we find that the presence of foreign firms in the domestic market (stock of 
inward FDI) exerts a significant positive impact
13. We interpret this as evidence that inward FDI 
creates  job  opportunities  for  skilled  workers,  thus  providing  an  incentive  to  enrol  in  a  higher 
education program. Looking at compositional effects (column 4) we observe that it is mostly driven 
by  formerly  planned  economies  (Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Romania  in  our  sample).  The 
overall effect of factor mobility onto higher education would be positive in our sample: despite 
weak evidence of brain drain from people migration, the incentives created by capital mobility 
would more than offset the disincentive to enrol tertiary education. 
 
2.3 One step further 
Given the way it is structured, our panel dataset does not offer large within-panel variation 
over the sample, both across countries and over time. This implies that when we try to account for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity  at the  country level by  estimating  a specific parameter  i m  
(fixed effect), we might end up capturing too much of it, with the estimated individual intercept 
washing out part of the effects that are supposed to be explained by the regressors. Thus one would 
think  that  it  would  be  better  not  to  consider  the  unobserved  component  as  a  parameter  to  be 
estimated  and  to  look  at  it  as  a  random  variable  (random  effect)  instead.  By  means  of  the 
                                                 
12 One additional control that has been introduced in previous literature is the share of fuel and raw materials exports in 
total exports. The rational is that if a country is natural resource abundant, its population has less incentives to get 
educated. We tried to include this indicator in our regressions for both secondary and tertiary enrolment and it generally 
got a minor negative impact, as expected; but because of many missing data in the series, it also causes a considerable 
drop in the number of observation we can rely on. So we decided to take it off from our specification. 
13 The impact of capital inflows onto higher educational attainment has been studied by Hegger et al. (2005), finding 
positive correlation in the Barro-Lee dataset.   10 
instrumental variables approach, we are tackling the possible simultaneous determination of the 
enrolment  rates  and  migration  rates  under  the  assumption  that  all  of  our  independents  are 
uncorrelated with the unobserved component (random effect) of our model. This is a very strict 
assumption since it is hard to exclude that something we do not observe affects migrating decisions 
as captured by migration rates. 
 
Table 2 – Gross enrolment rate – Tertiary Education (1990-2000) – Unbalanced Panel 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  OLS  FE  FE  FE  FE IV  HT 
log gdp per capita  0.005  0.024  0.03  0.033  0.031  0.027 
  [0.46]  [0.76]  [0.61]  [0.67]  [0.67]  [0.84] 
Infant mortality rate 1000 live birth  -0.001  0  -0.001  0  -0.001  0 
  [1.98]**  [0.23]  [0.73]  [0.47]  [0.86]  [1.01] 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks / GDP  -0.022  0.065  0.024  0.044  0.011  0.023 
  [0.47]  [1.02]  [0.42]  [0.65]  [0.21]  [0.59] 
log stock of inward FDI  0.008  0.022  0.015    0.016  0.017 
  [2.10]**  [2.91]***  [1.98]*    [2.47]**  [3.82]*** 
migration rate tertiary educ  -0.175  -0.217  -0.174  -0.113  0.206  -0.17 
   [5.62]***  [2.33]**  [1.43]  [0.98]  [0.59]  [1.68]* 
enrolment rate secondary 5 years before  0.288  0.099  0.079  0.102  0.151  0.093 
  [7.44]***  [0.95]  [0.72]  [0.94]  [1.41]  [1.42] 
log pupil/teacher primary      -0.043  0.008  -0.03  -0.046 
      [0.72]  [0.14]  [0.61]  [1.30] 
log Population density (people per sq. km)      -0.278  -0.173  -0.286  -0.207 
      [2.55]**  [1.55]  [2.92]***  [3.32]*** 
          1.215  migcountry (countries with mig.ter.>0.1  
or mig.sec.>0.05)            [2.32]** 
log inflow FDI´East Asia and Pacific        0.019     
        [1.13]     
log inflow FDI´European and Central Asia        0.023     
        [2.04]**     
log inflow FDI´Latin America and Caribbean        0.01     
        [0.53]     
log inflow FDI´Middle East and North Africa        0.004     
        [0.25]     
log inflow FDI´South Asia        -0.014     
        [0.80]     
log inflow FDI´Sub-Saharan Africa        -0.006     
        [0.81]     
Observations  181  181  162  162  162  162 
R-squared  0.68  0.55  0.63  0.69     
Number of id  108  108  103  103  103  103 
   Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   Year dummy included - regional controls included in HT  




A  way  to  partially  relax  this  assumption  and  to  allow  our  independent  variables  to  be 
correlated with the individual random effect ( i m ) is to proceed with the estimator proposed by 
Hausman and Taylor. Their original idea is that the set of regressors can be divided in four groups:   11 
a)  a vector of exogenous, time-varying variables ( i 1 X ) assumed to be uncorrelated with both 
random effect ( i m ) and idiosyncratic disturbance ( i u ); 
b)  a vector of endogenous, time-varying variables ( i 2 X ) assumed to be possibly correlated 
with random effect ( i m ) but orthogonal to idiosyncratic disturbance ( i u ); 
c)  a vector of exogenous, time-invariant variables ( i 1 Z ) assumed to be uncorrelated with both 
random effect ( i m ) and idiosyncratic disturbance ( i u ); 
d)  a vector of endogenous, time-invariant variables ( i 2 Z ) assumed to be possibly correlated 
with random effect ( i m ) but orthogonal to idiosyncratic disturbance ( i u ). 
The Hausman-Taylor estimator allows us to employ the regressors in groups  i 1 X  and  i 1 Z  as 
instruments for the independent variables in groups  i 2 X  and  i 2 Z , obtaining consistent estimates for 
the corresponding coefficients. We assume that migration rates are included in group  i 2 X . All other 
time-varying regressors are assumed to be part of group  i 1 X , thus implying that among others the 
(log of) population density will act also as an instrumental variable for migration rates [as in Beine 
et  al.  (2001)].  We  also  created  a  time-invariant  variable,  migcountry,    intended  to  capture  the 
unobservables that make one country more likely than another to be net exporter of migrants. This 
variable  assumes value 1 if a country is a typical source of migrants over time (migration rates 
greater  than  the  sample  average  in  both  years)  and  0  in  the  opposite  case;  it  is  supposedly 
endogenous  and  is  therefore  included  in  i 2 Z .  Docquier  and  Sekkat  (2006)  collect  a  series  of 
stylised facts about trends in brain drain showing that highest migration rates of skilled workers are 
associated  with  countries  presenting  specific  characteristics  (middle-income  countries,  small  in 
population  size)  and  that  are  either  islands  or  located  in  specific  areas  (Sub  Sahara,  Central 
America).  Our  migcountry  variable  is  supposed  to  capture  this  higher  propensity  to  migrate  of 
people born in these countries. We introduce 6 regional controls for sub areas (according to the 
World Bank classification), thus getting closer to the fixed effects specification. These geographical 
dummies are assumed to be part of group  i 2 Z  as well. We report results obtained by means of the 
H-T estimator for both secondary and tertiary enrolments in column 6 of both Table 1 and Table 2. 
In Table 1 we observe that results under H-T estimator are similar to what we obtained using 
fixed effect estimator. Focusing on factor mobility, migration rates of tertiary educated workers has 
no impact on secondary school enrolment, whereas the negative sign on the (log of) inward stock of 
FDI’s coefficient persists. On the contrary, in Table 2 we find an opposite result: migration rate of 
skilled workers discourages enrolments (brain drain), but the presence of foreign firms on domestic 
market provides positive incentives to enrol in higher education programs. Thus, we would be in the   12 
presence of a peculiar form of brain waste. Natives would be attracted into tertiary education by 
existing job opportunity created by foreign firms in the local economy (stock of inward FDI), but 
the outflow of tertiary graduates through migration would offset this tendency. In fact, the relevant 
elasticities are rather different at sample averages: by considering an estimated coefficient between 
-0.15 and -0.20, the migration elasticity lies in a interval comprised between 0.22 and 0.29, while 
the elasticity of the inward FDI stock (using an estimated coefficient of 0.02) is equal to 0.18. Thus, 
if any, the former effect should dominate the latter, and the overall impact would be a reduction in 
human  capital  accumulation  of  a  country  exporting  skilled  labour.  This  conclusion  would  be 
reinforced if we add the result that inward FDI discourage secondary enrolment, which produce the 
intake for tertiary enrolment. 
Our results are in line with those obtained by Groizard and Llull (2006) but we model the 
stock-flow relationship in a more consistent way. In fact, they study the impact of skilled migration 
on the cumulated stock of human capital in the country, which almost by construction yields a 
negative impact (since there is a one-to-one correspondence between a migration of a graduate 
worker and a (marginal) decline in the average years of education in the working population of the 
source country). On the contrary, if there are disincentive effects of migration, these should work 
through  the  accumulation  of  new  human  capital,  namely  the  enrolment  (and,  if  available, 
completion) rates, as we have done in our regressions. In addition, they neglect other factors that 
may affect the educational attainment in the country, out of the initial level, while we have provided 
a richer picture of the process. 
Thus our overall conclusion of this section casts doubt on the presumed beneficial effect of 
factor mobility onto domestic accumulation of human capital. On one side there is some evidence 
that skilled labour migration plays a disincentive effect on enrolment decision at the corresponding 
level of education. On the other side there is a more robust evidence that inward FDI modify the 
relative  incentives  to  acquire  education  (possibly  through  the  adjustment  of  relative  returns  to 
educational attainment). Using the final column estimates of Tables 1 and 2, a 10% increase in the 
stock of FDI reduces the enrolment rate at secondary level of 0.24 percent points (corresponding to 
a reduction of –0.13%) while increasing the enrolment rate at tertiary level by 0.17 (corresponding 
to an increase of +0.02%). If we include also the negative impact associated to the reduction in the 
intake  from  secondary  education,  the  beneficial  effect  of  FDI  on  tertiary  enrolment  would  be 
equivalent to a negligible 0.01 percentage point increase.   13 
  
3. Are FDI attracted by the availability of human capital? 
It  has  been  argued  that  foreign  firms  determine  the  choice  of  location  looking  at  the 
availability of high level of HC. Thus, along with other possible determinants, relative endowment 
of HC should affect the attractiveness of certain locations. Related questions concern the type of 
human capital (education and skills) that foreign investors are seeking for, and whether different 
types of firms seek different sets of skills. 
Our second equation aims to model the dynamics of physical capital accumulation through 
domestic inflow of foreign capitals. A linear version of equation (6) in Appendix B describes the 
determinants of FDI inflows, including the domestic endowment of human capital  
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where the cumulated sum of past FDI proxies the current stock of foreign capitals,  Z  is a set of 
country specific factors affecting investment decision choices (control variables),  i g  is a country 
(area) fixed effect,  t t  is a time fixed effect and  it l  is an error term. 
  In order to fully account for possible feedback effects due to factor mobility, it would be 
desirable to include in this specification the impact of return migration on the inflows of FDI. 
Unfortunately comparable cross-country series on return migration rates are not available. Including 
alternative measures of the stock of national migrants living abroad in the investing countries is a 
method adopted in recent contributions to account for possible network effects
14. This approach 
requires a strict bilateral setting, otherwise it would be impossible to ascertain whether largest flows 
of FDI to the domestic economy actually come from countries hosting larger share of own migrants. 
Unfortunately,  data  on  FDI  flows  available  for  developing  countries  are  rarely  collected  on  a 
bilateral basis, and to maintain the cross-country dimension of our analysis we are forced to employ 
data on total inflows and stocks of FDI regardless of the country of origin. 
 
3.1 Dataset and variables definition 
We  have  created  a  second  dataset  integrating  series  on  average  net  inflows  of  FDI  (as 
percentage  of  GDP)  computed  on  a  four-year  basis  (1990-1993,  1995-1998,  2000-2003)  from 
UNCTAD database with series on alternative proxies for human capital stocks obtained from Barro 
and  Lee  (2000).  We  also  add  some  controls  usually  introduced  in  the  literature  studying  the 
                                                 
14 See Docquier and Lodigiani (2006) and Javorcik et al. (2006).   14 
determinants of foreign direct investment (market-seeking, efficiency-seeking): i) (log of) inward 
stock of FDI, to take into account the effects of reinvested profits and scale economies; ii) (log of) 
GDP per capita, to proxy the stage of development; iii) (log of) population, to capture “market size” 
effects; iv) price inflation, measured by consumer price index annual percent changes, averaged 
over 5-year intervals (1988-1992, 1993-1997, 1998-2002), to account for economic stability; v) to 
account for political stability and other determinants of institutional quality we rely on six different 
indicators  collected  by  Kaufmann  et  al.  (2004):  Voice  and  Accountability,  Political  Stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of law, Control of Corruption. Since all these 
measures  (which  are  obtained  by  aggregating  different  opinion  surveys  worldwide)  are  highly 
correlated among them , we summarise them by extracting a common factor from the series using 
factor analysis (principal component method). The first common factor obtained, which is used in 
our analysis, summarizes up to the 78% of original series variations
15; vi) we also include trade 
openness (proxied by the (Import + Export) share in GDP) to consider the exposure to globalisation 
forces in a country; vii) following our previous work (Faini 2004), we finally include telephone 
mainlines (per 1000 people), to account for the endowment of infrastructures at country level. 
 
This  set of control variables includes what current empirical literature recognizes as major 
determinants. Nevertheless, the focus of our analysis is the identification of a potential role of the 
HC  endowment  in  attracting  FDI;  given  the  fact  that  we  try  to  capture  possible  fixed-effect 
(group/country  specific)  with  appropriate  estimation  techniques,  the  possible  risk  of  omitted 
variables does not seem to be a major impediment. As far as our measure of the stock of domestic 
human capital is concerned, we have considered alternative measures, either based on the average 
years of education in the population or on the distribution of the educational attainment in the same 
population. We have selected the second alternative, because it allows us to distinguish between 
different levels of skill (associated to different level of educational attainments). 
Descriptive statistics of this dataset are reported in table A4. Since in this equation we do not 
rely on migration-related information, our dataset is not anymore restricted to two points in time: 
when considering the unbalanced version we have 198 observations from 67 countries, whereas the 
balanced panel is composed of 153 observations for 51 countries, referred to 1990, 1995 and 2000. 
There is only a partial overlap with the dataset used in the previous section (31 countries when 
considering  both  balanced  versions),  because  some  countries  (typically  the  poorest  among 
                                                 
15 Data collected in Kaufmann et al. (2004) go back to mid-1990s only. We use the first available observation for 1990 
and the proper one for 2000. An average of the two is assumed to be the corresponding value for 1995.   15 
developing countries)
16 report information on migration, but do not give account of FDI inflows, 
while some other countries (mostly low-to-middle income countries)
17 attract funds from abroad, 
but seem not sending migrants out of the country.  
 
3.2 Results 
Our results for the unbalanced panel using alternative measure for HC are reported in Table 
3  and  4  (respectively  secondary  and  tertiary  attainment).  Results  for  the  balanced  panel  are  in 
Tables A5 (secondary education) and A6 (tertiary education) in the Appendix A. Here again we 
start with OLS estimator (column 1), then we add regional controls (columns 2 to 5), and finally we 
pass to country fixed effect estimator (column 6). While we have experimented with alternative 
measures of human capital stock (the percentage of population attaining primary, secondary and 
tertiary education, and any possible combination of them), we find that only the population share 
with secondary school attainment is statistically significant (see Table 3). This measure of human 
capital stock is positively correlated with FDI inflow, as long as we do not include country fixed 
effect. We have already highlighted that country fixed effect clean away excessive variability in the 
data.  
Political  stability  seems  to  impact  positively  on  FDI  inflows,  as  opposed  to  economic 
instability (here proxied by the average inflation rate) which exerts a negative impact. A substantial 
part of inflows is due to reinvested profits or expansion of existing investments. Infrastructures 
(poorly proxied by telephone lines availability) seem not to play any significant role. Apparently, 
FDI look attracted by larger countries (in terms of population), while it is impossible to ascertain 
the role of the level of development, given the alternating sign on GDP per capita coefficient.
18 This 
is partly due to multicollinearity existing between the GDP per capita and the government factor 
(correlation in the unbalanced sample is equal to 0.65). Since more developed countries experience 
more stable governments (the executives are more effective, the rule of law is more frequently 
enforced, the level of corruption is lower, the regulatory quality is more valuable), the effect of 
                                                 
16 Countries included in the enrolment model of section 3 and not in the FDI model of section 4 are Bahrain, Benin, 
Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania,  Mongolia,  Morocco,  Mozambique,  Nepal,  Nigeria,  Oman,  Romania,  Rwanda,  Swaziland,  Tanzania, 
Vietnam (average GDP per capita in 2000 equivalent to 1354 US dollars). 
17  Countries  included  in  the  FDI  model  of  section  4  and  not  in  the  migration  model  of  section  3  are  Argentina, 
Bangladesh, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia, Honduras, Jordan, Kenya, Niger, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela, Zambia (average GDP per capita in  2000 equivalent to 1800 
US dollars). 
18 However, one has to remember that our dependent variable is the log of the ratio between FDI inflow and GDP. 
Therefore the actual sign of (log of) GDP is (1-coefficient reported in Table 3), which is positive up to column 5. For 
the same reason the coefficient on (log of) population is the difference between its coefficient and the coefficient on 
GDP per capita, thus attaining an overall positive sign.   16 
GDP per capita that we measure once we introduce this factor (from column 4 onward) is the net 
effect of the stage of development. 
 
Table 3 – 4-years Average Inflows of FDI – 1990-1995-2000 – Unbalanced Sample 
human capital = secondary education attainment 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  OLS  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  FE 
population with secondary completed  1.99  2.696  2.585  2.171  1.381  -0.314 
  [2.64]***  [3.48]***  [3.28]***  [2.76]***  [2.04]**  [0.09] 
Log gdp per capita  0.225  0.106  0.088  -0.27  -0.774  -1.553 
  [2.41]**  [0.77]  [0.60]  [1.78]*  [4.03]***  [2.03]* 
Log stock of inward FDI      0.072  0.123  0.532  0.159 
      [1.05]  [1.92]*  [4.43]***  [1.95] 
factor extracted from political variables        0.401  0.214  1.177 
        [2.27]**  [1.45]  [2.70]** 
Trade (% GDP)          0.002  -0.006 
          [0.80]  [1.65] 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)          -0.03  -0.023 
          [1.85]*  [2.39]* 
Log population          -0.477  0.774 
          [4.22]***  [0.50] 
Log telephone mainlines x 1000 inhabitants          0.129  -0.267 
          [0.94]  [1.10] 
Observations  198  198  192  180  175  175 
R-squared  0.18  0.34  0.35  0.4  0.55  0.54 
Number of id  71  71  70  68  67  67 
Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Year dummy included - RC (regional controls) included in OLS  
 
Table 4 – 4-years Average Inflows of FDI – 1990-1995-2000 – Unbalanced Sample 
human capital = tertiary education attainment 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  OLS  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  FE 
population with tertiary completed  1.004  1.398  0.856  0.393  1.584  -7.363 
  [0.63]  [0.75]  [0.46]  [0.23]  [1.17]  [1.36] 
Log gdp per capita  0.305  0.262  0.263  -0.15  -0.727  -1.365 
  [2.93]***  [2.11]**  [2.03]**  [0.94]  [3.51]***  [1.70] 
Log stock of inward FDI      0.058  0.116  0.53  0.168 
      [0.83]  [1.79]*  [4.26]***  [2.11]* 
factor extracted from political variables        0.438  0.227  1.218 
        [2.53]**  [1.59]  [2.87]** 
Trade (% GDP)          0.003  -0.006 
          [1.27]  [1.84] 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)          -0.029  -0.024 
          [1.86]*  [2.34]* 
Log population          -0.474  0.602 
          [3.95]***  [0.38] 
Log telephone mainlines x 1000 inhabitants          0.134  -0.305 
          [0.95]  [1.24] 
Observations  198  198  192  180  175  175 
R-squared  0.16  0.31  0.32  0.38  0.55  0.55 
Number of id  71  71  70  68  67  67 
Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   17 
Year dummy included - RC (regional controls) included in OLS  
 
When analysing the relationship between an elastic supply of HC and the inflows of capital 
from  abroad,  it  is  crucial  to  discuss  the  nature  of  foreign  investment.  If  FDI  is  aimed  to  the 
exploitation of natural resources, the local availability of educated people might be less relevant 
than in the case of investments in manufacturing or services. Furthermore, FDI trends reveal a 
significant geographical concentration pattern by type of investment
19. For both the African and the 
Middle-East regions the share of FDI inflows in the primary sector has remained high and constant 
over time, since a large number of MNEs operating in Africa are still attracted by the abundance of 
natural resources rather than by the market size or by host-country investment climate. The Latin 
American and the Caribbean regions show a large drop in the share of the manufacturing sector 
investment, associated with a corresponding increase in the share of the services sector. The Asian 
as well as the Central Eastern European region exhibit a large and stable share in the manufacturing 
sector. 
These  considerations  provide  a  possible  explanation  to  the  fact  that,  by  and  large, 
specifications with OLS and regional controls perform better than those with country fixed effects. 
Since we do not have country-level information on the type of FDI, we are forced to adopt an 
overall  measure  of  capital  inflows;  this  may  explain  why  regional  controls  provide  better  fit, 
because they may capture this compositional effect in FDI inflows. 
 
4. Policy implications 
Is there any evidence of a virtuous circle of human capital formation and increased inflow of 
FDI? What are the implications of our estimates? In order to adapt our estimates to our theoretical 
framework  (see  Appendix  B),  we  need  to  clarify  the  relationship  between  human  capital  and 
enrolment  rates.  If  we  approximate  the  total  human  capital  stock  H   by  the  average  years  of 
education in the population, it is defined as  T l S l P l H t s p × + × + × =  where  t s p l l l , ,  are respectively 
the school length of primary, secondary and tertiary education, while  T S P , ,  are the corresponding 
population shares. Taking  t s p l l l , ,  as fixed, we have that  T l S l P l H t s p & & & & × + × + × = . If we consider 
that educational attainment affects differently life expectancy, the share of population with a given 
educational  attainment  increases  whenever  the  corresponding  enrolment  rate  is  greater  than  the 
existing share. For example the variation of the population share with secondary education can be 
                                                 
19 See Myamoto (2003).   18 







= & . Thus the variation of human capital 
stock is given by 
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Thus  equation  (3)  implies  that  the  overall  effect  of  FDI  on  the  accumulation  of  human 
































.  If  we 
neglect  the  impact  of  FDI  on  primary  enrolment,  where  it  is  statistically  insignificant  in  any 
specification, and we take the estimates reported in the Hausman-Taylor column of Table 1 and 2, 
we  obtain  that  ( ) 00058 . 0 017 . 0 024 . 0
60
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which is negative but rather small. Since  K  is measured in logs, it implies that doubling the stock 
of FDI ( 1 + = DK ) would (dynamically) decrease the human capital stock by 0.00058 years, while 
changing the skill composition in the labour force in favour of tertiary educated workers.  
If we take the migration decision as exogenous, the Jacobian corresponding to system (8) in 
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which is saddle-path stable.  
  Going to the debate over brain gain/drain, let us consider an exogenous increase in migration 
of skilled (tertiary educated) workers, in the order of 100%. At sample mean of the balanced panel, 
this implies a passage from 0.145 to 0.290. Looking at Tables 1 and 2 (last column) this implies a 
reduction in secondary enrolment of 3.7 (corresponding to an impact of –0.257´+0.145) and in 
tertiary enrolment of 2.4 (corresponding to an  impact of –0.17´+0.145).  If we are available to 
                                                 
20 The figures reported in the second row of the Jacobian (4) are obtained by OLS regression of average FDI flow onto 
FDI  stock  and  average  years  of  education  in  the  population,  which  replaces  the  population  shares  with  different 
educational attainment (primary, secondary and tertiary). The estimated coefficient for average years of education on 
the unbalanced sample is 
[ ] 67 . 2
158 . 0 , while for log of FDI inflow is 
[ ] 24 . 2
138 . 0 . Finally, the coefficient of  H H ¶ ¶ / &  is derived 
under the assumption of identical life expectancy for any educational attainment, equal to 60 years ( 016 . 0
60
1
- = - ).   19 
assume that the average school length at secondary and tertiary level is approximately 5 years, we 
obtain a reduction in the average years of education of 0.30, approximately one third of one year of 
schooling in the population. We now know from previous results, that this produces a reduction in 
capital inflow: since our dependent variable in the estimation of Table 3 is the log of the ratio 
between capital inflow and GDP, a variation of –0.19 (corresponding to +0.647´–0.306) implies a 
significant drop of capital inflows, in the order of pre-existing flows (equal to 0.18 at sample mean 
of the balanced panel). In the long run, this reduction cumulates in lower stock, yielding lower 
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  When we graph the country position according to these state variables (human capital stock 
H , proxied by the average years of education in the population, and physical capital stock,  K , 
proxied by the log of foreign investment) we observe that countries are aligned along a ray exiting 
from the origin (see figure 1). Qualitative analysis of the dynamic properties of dynamical system 
described by equation (4) indicates that the stable branch of the saddle path will exhibit a negative 
slope comprised between  036 . 0
016 . 0
00058 . 0
- @ -  and  873 . 0
158 . 0
138 . 0
- @ - , while the unstable branch can be   20 
either positively or strongly negatively sloped. Thus, according to our model, most of the countries 
would be positioned on unstable paths, that lead either to infinite values in both  H  and  K , or to a 
poverty trap where both variable tend to zero value. In both cases, along the unstable braches, both 
human  capital  and  physical  capital  move  together,  exhibiting  a  complementary  nature.  On  the 
contrary, on the stable branches, the two types of capital do exhibit negative correlation, coherently 
with our empirical finding of an overall negative feedback of FDI onto the accumulation of HC. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Two main results are obtained in this paper, and can be summarized as follows: 
1.  we do not find strong evidence of the existence of a virtuous cycle between human capital 
accumulation and foreign direct investment. In our estimates, FDI discourages secondary 
enrolment while favouring tertiary enrolment, but the overall effect is negative. On the other 
side, in our data FDI seem to be attracted by existing endowment of human capital, but only 
at  the  secondary  level.  Thus,  as  in  any  saddle-path  stable  system,  there  is  a  unique 
combination of stocks of human capital and foreign capital leading to a stable equilibrium, 
but all other combinations lead to unstable path; 
2.  in addition to direct reduction of domestic human capital, we find evidence of a sort of brain 
drain  through  skilled  (tertiary  educated)  worker  migration.  We  interpret  this  result  as 
disincentive effect: when the domestic population observes that a large share of university 
graduate migrates, it takes this as evidence of lack of adequate local job opportunities, and 
reduces the corresponding investment in higher education. 
On  both  grounds,  less  developed  countries  are  not  benefited  by  factor  mobility:  they  loose 
domestic human capital under both foreign capital inflow and domestic human capital outflow. 
Unfortunately we do not possess data on the type of FDI involved in this analysis. Looking at their 
geographical  distribution,  we  suspect  that  our  story  involves  natural  resource  exploitation  (like 
mining and oil extraction) rather than Greenfield investment. In such a case the local endowment of 
human capital is less relevant, as well as the incentive to further human capital accumulation. 
   21 
APPENDIX A – Additional tables 
Table A1 – Descriptive statistics (1990-2000)  
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
  unbalanced panel  balanced panel 
gross enrolment rate secondary  283  0.55  0.30  0.05  1.15  114  0.48  0.28  0.05  1.05 
gross enrolment rate tertiary  255  0.15  0.14  0.00  0.59  114  0.12  0.12  0.00  0.51 
Enrolment rate primary 5 years before  254  0.91  0.25  0.10  1.47  114  0.92  0.23  0.25  1.47 
Enrolment rate secondary 5 years before  254  0.49  0.30  0.03  1.19  114  0.43  0.26  0.03  1.02 
log GDP per capita  277  6.95  1.18  4.45  9.69  114  6.77  1.21  4.45  9.38 
log stock of inward FDI  267  6.40  2.34  0.00  12.17  114  7.05  2.20  0.00  11.54 
infant mortality rate 1000 live birth  298  56.80  40.80  4.10  191.00  114  62.64  38.83  8.10  158.00 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks / GDP  250  0.23  0.19  0.00  1.04  114  0.23  0.18  0.00  0.94 
log pupil/teacher primary  249  7.94  0.41  6.97  8.95  114  8.08  0.40  6.97  8.84 
Migration rate secondary educ  281  0.08  0.14  0.00  0.70  114  0.04  0.06  0.00  0.30 
Migration rate tertiary educ  281  0.21  0.23  0.00  0.92  114  0.15  0.16  0.00  0.84 
log Population density (people per sq. km)  295  3.87  1.31  0.30  6.90  114  3.81  1.32  0.30  6.85 
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Table A2 – Gross enrolment rate – Secondary Education (1990-2000) – Balanced Panel 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  OLS  FE  FE  FE  FE IV  HT 
log gdp per capita  0.087  0.193  0.177  0.204  0.174  0.194 
  [4.91]***  [2.55]**  [2.05]**  [2.37]**  [1.86]*  [2.82]*** 
Infant mortality rate 1000 live birth  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  [4.95]***  [0.66]  [1.17]  [1.15]  [0.99]  [0.98] 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks / GDP  0.059  0.126  0.136  0.121  0.133  0.128 
  [0.64]  [0.91]  [1.16]  [0.93]  [1.26]  [1.56] 
log stock of inward FDI  -0.012  -0.012  -0.028    -0.027  -0.02 
  [1.28]  [1.72]*  [3.62]***    [2.15]**  [2.22]** 
migration rate tertiary educ  -0.088  -0.244  -0.167  -0.162  -0.445  -0.183 
  [1.26]  [1.26]  [1.03]  [0.93]  [0.70]  [0.87] 
enrolment rate primary 5 years before  0.239  0.172  0.157  0.169  0.153  0.165 
  [3.92]***  [1.51]  [1.53]  [1.65]  [1.24]  [1.71]* 
log pupil/teacher primary      -0.049  -0.045  -0.049  -0.08 
      [0.64]  [0.50]  [0.54]  [1.15] 
log Population density (people per sq. km)      -0.58  -0.43  -0.562  -0.31 
      [2.86]***  [1.94]*  [2.76]***  [2.76]*** 
          1.323  migcountry (countries with mig.ter.>0.1  
or mig.sec.>0.05)            [1.63] 
log inflow FDI´East Asia and Pacific        -0.025     
        [1.53]     
log inflow FDI´European and Central Asia        -0.02     
        [1.97]*     
log inflow FDI´Latin America and Caribbean        0.002     
        [0.04]     
log inflow FDI´Middle East and North Africa        -0.068     
        [2.48]**     
log inflow FDI´South Asia        -0.096     
        [5.75]***     
log inflow FDI´Sub-Saharan Africa        -0.037     
        [2.18]**     
Observations  114  114  114  114  114  114 
R-squared  0.78  0.53  0.61  0.66     
Number of id  57  57  57  57  57  57 
Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Year dummy included - regional controls included in HT -  IV for FE: log of stock of own migrants in US and in EU (10 years 
before) 
 
Countries included: Algeria, Bahrain, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the, Congo, Rep. of the, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe. 
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Table A3 – Gross enrolment rate – Tertiary Education (1990-2000) – Balanced Panel 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  OLS  FE  FE  FE  FE IV  HT 
log gdp per capita  -0.018  0.027  0.028  0.032  0.017  0.033 
  [1.36]  [0.76]  [0.61]  [0.69]  [0.34]  [1.01] 
Infant mortality rate 1000 live birth  -0.001  0  -0.001  0  -0.001  0 
  [2.06]**  [0.48]  [0.86]  [0.56]  [0.80]  [1.03] 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks / GDP  0.048  0.01  0.022  0.042  0.012  0.017 
  [0.93]  [0.18]  [0.43]  [0.72]  [0.22]  [0.45] 
log stock of inward FDI  0.012  0.024  0.015    0.015  0.019 
  [3.38]***  [3.26]***  [2.30]**    [2.29]**  [4.47]*** 
migration rate tertiary educ  -0.168  -0.177  -0.16  -0.106  0.312  -0.16 
   [4.71]***  [1.31]  [1.36]  [0.98]  [0.74]  [1.58] 
enrolment rate secondary 5 years before  0.246  0.136  0.09  0.111  0.181  0.1 
  [5.84]***  [1.34]  [0.91]  [1.13]  [1.48]  [1.56] 
log pupil/teacher primary      -0.039  0.011  -0.023  -0.052 
      [0.75]  [0.22]  [0.43]  [1.54] 
log Population density (people per sq. km)      -0.287  -0.184  -0.315  -0.139 
      [2.92]***  [1.75]*  [2.93]***  [2.84]*** 
          0.448  migcountry (countries with mig.ter.>0.1  
or mig.sec.>0.05)            [1.38] 
log inflow FDI´East Asia and Pacific        0.019     
        [1.33]     
log inflow FDI´European and Central Asia        0.023     
        [2.35]**     
log inflow FDI´Latin America and Caribbean        0.009     
        [0.51]     
log inflow FDI´Middle East and North Africa        0.004     
        [0.33]     
log inflow FDI´South Asia        -0.014     
        [0.92]     
log inflow FDI´Sub-Saharan Africa        -0.005     
        [0.90]     
Observations  114  114  114  114  114  114 
R-squared  0.68  0.54  0.63  0.69     
Number of id  57  57  57  57  57  57 
  Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Year dummy included - regional controls included in HT 
  IV for FE: log of stock of own migrants in US and in EU (10 years before) 
 
Countries included: Algeria, Bahrain, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the, Congo, Rep. of the, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.   24 
 
Table A4 – Descriptive statistics – 1990-1995-2000  
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
  unbalanced panel  balanced panel 
log of inflow over GDP - average over 3 years  384  0.46  1.42  -4.68  4.31  153  0.36  1.33  -4.68  3.37 
population share with secondary   224  0.18  0.12  0.01  0.50  153  0.20  0.11  0.01  0.50 
population share with tertiary completed  224  0.06  0.06  0.00  0.22  153  0.07  0.06  0.00  0.22 
log gdp per capita  418  6.92  1.18  4.03  9.69  153  7.05  1.05  4.45  8.95 
log stock of inward FDI  390  6.50  2.27  -0.69  12.17  153  7.75  1.78  1.79  12.17 
factor extracted from political variables  362  0.00  1.00  -2.57  3.06  153  0.23  0.92  -2.45  3.06 
Trade (% GDP)  411  80.96  40.34  3.15  228.88  153  70.22  38.90  14.99 228.88 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)  373  0.88  4.44  -0.03  53.99  153  1.32  6.47  -0.03  53.99 
log population  448  15.38  2.01  10.62  20.96  153  16.48  1.56  13.55  20.96 
log telephone mainlines x 1000 inhabitants  453  87.97 107.87  0.20  559.67  153  67.33  72.06  0.20  371.98 
 
 
Table A5 – 3-years Average Inflows of FDI – 1990-2000 – Balanced Panel –  
human capital = secondary attainment 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  OLS  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  FE 
population with secondary completed  1.381  1.912  1.906  1.602  1.798  -0.146 
  [1.95]*  [2.57]**  [2.54]**  [2.11]**  [2.81]***  [0.04] 
log gdp per capita  0.266  0.163  0.144  -0.192  -0.819  -1.659 
  [2.62]***  [1.11]  [0.86]  [1.18]  [3.94]***  [2.18]* 
log stock of inward FDI      0.031  0.089  0.503  0.193 
      [0.42]  [1.34]  [3.90]***  [2.29]* 
factor extracted from political variables        0.329  0.167  1.141 
        [1.71]*  [1.11]  [2.44]* 
Trade (% GDP)          -0.031  -0.023 
          [2.01]**  [2.39]* 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)          0.003  -0.006 
          [1.17]  [1.71] 
log population          -0.515  0.858 
          [4.57]***  [0.54] 
log telephone mainlines x 1000 inhabitants          0.115  -0.239 
          [0.83]  [0.96] 
Observations  153  153  153  147  147  147 
R-squared  0.2  0.37  0.37  0.42  0.59  0.56 
Number of id  51  51  51  51  51  51 
Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Year dummies included – RC (regional controls) included in OLS . 
 
Countries included: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep. of the, Congo, Rep. 
of the, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iran, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.    25 
Table A6 – 3-years Average Inflows of FDI – 1990-1995-2000 – Balanced Panel 
human capital = tertiary attainment 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
  OLS  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  OLS+RC  FE 
population with tertiary completed  0.049  0.304  0.259  -0.36  1.101  -6.31 
  [0.03]  [0.16]  [0.14]  [0.20]  [0.75]  [1.15] 
log gdp per capita  0.331  0.309  0.288  -0.094  -0.716  -1.497 
  [2.94]***  [2.30]**  [1.86]*  [0.54]  [3.26]***  [1.90] 
log stock of inward FDI      0.033  0.094  0.502  0.2 
      [0.43]  [1.40]  [3.66]***  [2.40]* 
factor extracted from political variables        0.365  0.206  1.181 
        [1.94]*  [1.40]  [2.58]* 
Trade (% GDP)          0.004  -0.007 
          [1.52]  [1.85] 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)          -0.029  -0.024 
          [1.97]*  [2.35]* 
log population          -0.502  0.737 
          [4.02]***  [0.47] 
log telephone mainlines x 1000 inhabitants          0.107  -0.277 
          [0.73]  [1.09] 
Observations  153  153  153  147  147  147 
R-squared  0.19  0.35  0.35  0.41  0.58  0.57 
Number of id  51  51  51  51  51  51 
      Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      Year dummies included – RC (regional controls) included in OLS  
 
Countries included: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep. of the, Congo, Rep. 
of the, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iran, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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APPENDIX B – Theoretical considerations 
 
We  are  interested  in  analysing  the  long  run  consequences  of  factor  mobility  on  human 
capital investment in developing countries, when feedbacks from capitals and workers mobility 
onto educational choices of the population are taken into account. While in the empirical analysis 
we will distinguish between different types of educational attainment (as proxy for different degrees 
of skill in the workforce), here let us define  M  as the migration rate (defined as the fraction of 
nationals  leaving  the  domestic  country,  which  is  assumed  to  take  the  role  of  “less  developed” 
economy), H  as the domestic human capital stock and K  as the domestic physical capital stock. 
While in principle an economy could be either exporter or importer of both workers and 
capital, developing countries are typically net exporter of workers and net importer of (foreign) 
capital in the form of foreign direct investment. In addition, the low level of domestic production 
and/or  the  high  level  of  domestic  absorption  make  it  rather  difficult  to  obtain  domestic 
accumulation of physical capital. For this reason we assume that immigration of foreign workers 
and domestic investment are set to zero. 
Domestic  human  capital  can  be  augmented  through  (domestic)  school  attendance  and 
decreased through migration of educated workers (the so-called “brain  drain”). However, some 
recent literature has drawn attention on the potential existence of a sort of “brain gain” through 
which the educational achievement, by favouring the chance to emigrate, would represent a sort of 
incentive to acquire  education,  yielding an overall positive balance of  migration onto domestic 
human capital accumulation. 
Since both possibility are equally likely, and we are agnostic on this issue, we leave the data 
speak. Therefore our first equation is given by 
  ( ) M X M K e H e - =
± + , , &   (5) 
where  dt dH H / = &  (the Newtonian derivative),  ( ) e X M K e , ,  summarises school enrolment (with a 
supposedly positive impact of foreign investment  K  in the domestic economy, an ambiguous effect 
of  migration  M   and  country  specific  factors  e X   affecting  educational  choices  –  like  income 
inequality, poverty, school resources and so on). Equation (5) indicates that domestic human capital 
stock is increased by school attendance and decreased by migration of educated workers (even if in 
the  long  run  the  incentive  created  by  migration  may  rise  enrolment  and  therefore  its  long  run 
stock).. The sign of  0 / > dM de  is taken as indicator of the occurrence of “brain gain”, whereas 
0 / < dM de  is interpreted as evidence of “brain drain”.  
  Our second equation aims to model the dynamics of physical capital accumulation through 
domestic inflow of foreign capitals. We know from the literature that FDI tend to be attracted by the   27 
existence of local favourable conditions
21 (like infrastructure, political stability) as well as by the 
local availability of skilled labour [Lucas (1990), Zhang and Markusen (1999)], which is positively 
correlated  with  the  educational  attainment  in  the  population.  In  addition,  we  also  consider  the 
possibility  of  economies  of  scale  and/or  of  technology/knowledge  linkages:  both  make  a  new 
investment more likely in countries where other investments have already taken place. We also 
consider the possibility of a decline in the relative profitability of domestic investment (due to 
decreasing marginal productivity, exhaustion of raw materials, shortage of adequate skill): in such a 
case, the impact of current stock on new investment would be obviously negative. Thus our second 









h X H K k K , , &   (6) 
where  h X  indicates country specific factors affecting FDI inflows (i.e. infrastructures, degree of 
openness, country size, political stability, etc.). 
  Finally, our third equation takes into account the determinants of outward migration. Here 
again the literature is quite substantial. We do consider two aspects: the first one is the impact of the 
availability of skilled jobs on the decision to migrate, which is correlated with the technological 
level prevailing in the country; if the technological progress is embodied in the newly invested 
physical capital, then migration should report a negative correlation with foreign direct investment. 
The second aspect is the internal competition for skilled jobs, since the greater is the unemployment 
in  the  educated  labour  force,  the  longer  will  be  the  unemployment  spell,  and  the  more  likely 
becomes the migration. Our assumptions are then summarised in the following 
  ( ) m X H K m M , ,
± - =   (7) 
where  m X  include the identifying restrictions for this equation, like language facilities, distance, 
the former colony status, and so on. 
Equations (5)-(6)-(7) describe a dynamical system in 
2 R . In facts, by replacing equation (7) 
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  (8) 
                                                 
21  See  Blonigen  (2005)  for  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  literature  on  FDI  determinants.  Faini  (2004)  provides 
evidence of a positive effect of domestic human capital stock (proxied by average years of education in the population) 
as well as domestic infrastructure (proxied by telephone lines) onto FDI.   28 

















. The system incorporates a 
feed-back mechanism that contributes to its stabilisation. In facts, when capital stock increases, it 
tends to reduce (skilled) workers migration, thus favouring domestic accumulation of human capital 
(through the reduced outflow of skilled migrants as well as through an incentive effect on enrolled 
students to proceed further on in education). In its turn, an increase in human capital stock makes 
additional inflows of new capitals more likely. In both cases, global stability can be assessed only 
when the sign and the size of the elements on the Jacobian main diagonal are known.   29 
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